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dom and in his daily life practiced that law received from the God
of law.
His heart vibrated with love and affection when its cords with
human need or human suffering responded to its every call in loving
sympathy and tender ministrations.
An uncrowned king-an unsung hero -he lives in our hearts and
dwells in our lives, beautifying and making them more sacred. And
we realize
"He is not dead, he is just away,
With a cherry smile and a waive of the hand,
He has wandered into an unknown land,
He is not dead, he's just away."
We loved him because he was lovable--we grieve over his loss
because it is irreparable, and we lay this flower upon his grave
because
"You may break, you may shatter the vase if you will,
But the scent of the rose will hang 'round it still."
WARD C. YEAGER.

Synopsis of Some of the Leading Cases Recently Decided
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
CRADDOCK, VINSON & COMPANY VS. CONNECTICUT
FIRE INSURAINCE COMPANY.
This case was appealed from Hickman Circuit Court, and decided
October 27th, 1914.
In August, 1912, the appellants purchased a traction engine, water

tank, separator and two wind-stackers for $250, for which sum they
executed their note, the engine being valued by the seller at $200
and the balance of the property at $50. In September, i912, they
had this property insured in the appellee company for $955, distributed as follows: $53o on the engine, $6o on water tank, $200 on
separator, and $165 on stackers. In December, 1912, the separator
and wind-stackers were destroyed by fire, and to recover the insurance on the destroyed property, this suit was brought.
For defense the appellee relied on certain clauses in the policy,
one of them stipulating that "This indemnity contract is based upon
the representations and contained in the application of even numbers,
herewith and which the assured has signed and permitted to be submitted to the company, and the amount insured on articles described
in the policy are based on the size and age of each article, as stated
by the insured in his application, and which is made a warranty and
a part hereof. The assured waives the right to plead that he did not
know what the application contained; and it is stipulated and agreed
that if any false statements are made in said application, then the
entire policy shall be null and void." In the application it was
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stipulated that "if the statements in this application are not true, the
policy issued hereon will be void." It was further averred that the
company would not have taken a risk of any amount on the property
destroyed if it had been used more than seven years.
The application shovs that the appellants, in answer to certain
questions contained in the application, stated that the property had
been bought from different parties; that the purchase price was
$I,2OO, which was paid in cash; that the engine had been used seven
years, and the separator and stackers had been in use two years. It
was averred that each of these statements was false, and that the
entire property had been in use about twelve years, and that the purchase price was only $250, and that same was not paid in cash. That
the property was not bought from different parties, but from one
party.
In the reply it was sought to avoid the false statements in the
application upon the ground as stated that "It is true that they signed the application set out in the defendant's answer; but they deny
that at the time they signed said application the statement was in
said application that the purchase price of this outfit insured was
$1,2oo, and that this was paid in cash.
They say that at the time
they signed said application the same was filled out by the agent of
the defendant's writing said policy, and the application therefor. And
they deny that they stated to him that the purchase price of said
property was $1,200 cash; but they say they told him that said property was worth $i,20oo; that the statement in the application that
the purchase price was $1,200 was made without their knowledge and
after they had signed the application. * * * And they say the
statements in the application were written by the agent of the company after same had been signed by them, and they say that they
never saw said application and did not know that the statements complained of in the answer were in the application until after the fire."
They further denied that the property had been in use more than two
seasons.
The case went to trial before a jury, and after all .the evidence
had been introduced, the trial judge instructed the jury to return a
verdict for the appellee company, and it is of this ruling that the appellants complain. On the weight of the testimony on the connected
parts the court lays down the following law applicable in this case:
(i). False and material misstatements, if made by the insured in an application for fire insurance, will avoid the policy;
but if false and material misstatements are inserted by the agent
of the company without the consent or approval of the applicant,
the company can not rely on their falsity to defeat the insurance.
(2).
Where the insured, in an application for insurance on
machinery, stated that it cost $1,2oo and had only been in use two
years, when in fact it had cost only $25o and had been in use
more'than seven years, these false statements were material to
the risk and sufficient to defeat a recovery on the policy after
the destruction of the property by fire.

